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It	  is	  an	  archaeological	  commonplace	  that	  grazing	  across	  extensive	  pastures	  in	  many	  periods	  was	  shared,	  
often	  over	  extended	  lengths	  of	  time,	  by	  kin-­‐based	  communities	  who	  met	  there	  seasonally	  in	  large	  groups.	  
Such	  explanations	  are	  richly	  implicit	  with	  models	  of	  social	  relations	  –	  there	  were	  large	  communities,	  they	  
were	  made	  up	  of	  one	  or	  more	  kin	  groups,	  they	  shared	  pasture,	  and	  they	  had	  regular	  assemblies.	  How	  did	  
that	  general	  framework	  of	  social	  structure	  and	  social	  relations	  work	  in	  practice,	  particularly	  at	  the	  level	  of	  
the	  individual	  landholding?	  This	  paper	  explores	  the	  practical	  implications	  of	  a	  property	  rights	  approach	  to	  
those	  questions,	  briefly	  illustrated	  in	  indicative	  examples	  drawn	  from	  the	  English	  fenlands	  across	  the	  longue	  
durée.	  Its	  central	  contention	  is	  that	  the	  mutualities	  implied	  in	  the	  equitable,	  ‘horizontal’	  governance	  of	  
shared	  resources	  complemented	  and	  enriched	  ‘vertical’	  hierarchies	  of	  power	  and	  status	  in	  complex	  societies	  
of	  which	  they	  were	  both	  part.	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Introduction	  
It	  is	  an	  archaeological	  commonplace	  that	  grazing	  across	  extensive	  pastures	  in	  many	  periods	  was	  shared,	  
often	  over	  extended	  lengths	  of	  time,	  by	  kin-­‐based	  communities	  who	  met	  there	  seasonally	  in	  large	  groups.	  
Models	  of	  Neolithic	  exploitation	  of	  the	  4,000	  square	  km	  wetlands	  of	  the	  English	  fenlands	  offer	  an	  indicative	  
illustration.	  They	  are	  construed	  as	  having	  provided	  communal	  grazing	  for	  the	  stock	  of	  ‘large	  numbers	  of	  
people	  perhaps	  from	  several	  communities’,	  made	  up	  of	  a	  number	  of	  kin-­‐groups,	  who	  came	  together	  at	  the	  
time	  of	  the	  autumn	  round-­‐up	  in	  assemblies	  at	  causewayed	  enclosures	  like	  those	  at	  Etton	  and	  Haddenham	  
(Pryor	  1998,	  364;	  see	  also	  Evans	  and	  Hodder	  2006,	  336;	  Evans	  and	  Serjeantson	  1988,	  366)	  (Figure	  1).	  
Interpretations	  based	  on	  similar	  collectivity	  are	  offered	  for	  Bronze	  Age	  exploitation	  of	  the	  fen	  basin,	  where	  –	  
it	  is	  suggested	  –	  there	  were	  substantial	  autumn	  gatherings	  of	  kin-­‐based	  communities	  during	  which	  vast	  
numbers	  of	  sheep	  were	  rounded	  up	  and	  sorted	  in	  large	  stockyards	  strung	  out	  along	  the	  north-­‐western	  fen-­‐
edge	  at	  such	  places	  as	  Flag	  Fen	  and	  West	  Deeping	  (Pryor	  2001,	  402-­‐4,	  416).	  
Figure	  1	  about	  here	  
Such	  explanations	  are	  richly	  implicit	  with	  models	  of	  social	  relations	  –	  there	  were	  large	  communities,	  they	  
were	  made	  up	  of	  a	  number	  of	  kin	  groups,	  they	  shared	  pasture,	  and	  they	  had	  regular	  assemblies.	  How	  did	  
that	  general	  framework	  of	  social	  structure	  and	  social	  relations	  work	  in	  practice,	  particularly	  at	  the	  level	  of	  
the	  individual	  landholding?	  This	  paper	  explores	  the	  practical	  implications	  of	  a	  property	  rights	  approach	  to	  
those	  questions	  whose	  potential	  for	  contributing	  to	  future	  research	  is	  briefly	  illustrated	  in	  indicative	  
examples	  drawn	  from	  the	  fen	  basin	  across	  the	  longue	  durée.	  	  
The	  paper	  begins	  with	  a	  discussion	  of	  commoning	  in	  terms	  of	  property	  rights;	  it	  moves	  on	  to	  examine	  the	  
implications	  of	  common	  rights	  for	  structures	  of	  governance;	  it	  discusses	  the	  complementary	  relationship	  
between	  social,	  political	  and	  other	  hierarchies	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  the	  equity	  that	  characterises	  the	  
governance	  of	  shared	  resources	  on	  the	  other;	  it	  explores	  the	  implications	  of	  shared	  property	  rights	  for	  
inferring	  greater	  granularity	  in	  relationships	  between	  individuals,	  and	  between	  individuals	  and	  their	  
communities;	  and	  it	  builds	  on	  existing	  research	  demonstrating	  the	  universality	  across	  space	  and	  time	  of	  the	  
principles	  of	  commoning	  to	  suggest	  their	  local	  longevity	  across	  the	  longue	  durée.	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Rights	  of	  common	  as	  property	  rights	  	  
Access	  to	  and	  the	  exercise	  of	  agricultural	  property	  rights	  enable	  an	  individual	  to	  make	  a	  reasonably	  
predictable	  living,	  provide	  opportunities	  to	  generate	  a	  surplus	  or	  acquire	  goods,	  and	  allow	  personal	  
interaction	  with	  elites	  through	  tribute,	  gift-­‐giving	  or	  taxation.	  That	  is,	  all	  aspects	  of	  a	  stable,	  sustainable,	  
farming	  economy	  depend	  on	  rights	  of	  property	  over	  land	  of	  whose	  antiquity	  there	  is	  widespread	  recognition	  
among	  anthropologists,	  archaeologists	  and	  other	  social	  scientists	  (e.g.	  Ingold	  1980,	  82-­‐143;	  Hunt	  and	  Gilman	  
1998;	  Feinman	  2001;	  Holling	  2001;	  Trawick	  2001;	  Fleming	  2008;	  Acheson	  2011,	  329-­‐332).	  The	  focus	  of	  this	  
paper	  is	  on	  shared	  or	  common	  (rather	  than	  private	  or	  public)	  rights	  of	  property:	  they	  are	  equitable,	  legal	  
rights	  held	  by	  an	  exclusive	  group	  of	  right-­‐holders	  in	  the	  restricted	  exploitation	  of	  a	  shared	  (frequently	  
natural)	  resource	  with	  defined	  boundaries	  (Östrom	  1990).	  	  
Archaeological	  scholarship	  on	  rights	  of	  common	  property	  has	  largely	  been	  undertaken	  in	  American	  research	  
on	  collective	  action	  and	  public	  goods	  (e.g.,	  Hayden	  and	  Cannon	  1982;	  Hunt	  and	  Gilman	  1998;	  Feinman	  2000,	  
2001;	  Fargher	  2009,	  2010;	  Fargher,	  Espinoza,	  and	  Blanton	  2011;	  Carballo	  2013;	  Carballo,	  Roscoe,	  and	  
Feinman	  2014).	  While	  there	  is	  a	  widespread	  assumption	  in	  Britain	  of	  the	  exercise	  of	  common	  property	  rights	  
in	  areas	  of	  prehistoric,	  Romano-­‐British	  and	  early	  medieval	  pasture	  otherwise	  empty	  of	  settlement,	  the	  
implications	  for	  social	  structures	  and	  relations	  of	  that	  premise	  are	  not	  generally	  explored	  (for	  exceptions,	  
e.g.	  Fleming	  2008;	  Herring	  2008;	  Oosthuizen	  2011).	  	  
The	  importance	  of	  property	  rights	  in	  an	  agricultural	  economy	  can	  be	  illustrated	  through	  the	  example	  of	  
households	  who	  send	  their	  animals	  seasonally	  to	  a	  distant	  pasture.	  These	  men	  and	  women	  need	  to	  be	  sure	  
that	  their	  animals	  will	  be	  safe	  on	  the	  journey,	  that	  their	  stock	  will	  be	  allowed	  to	  graze	  when	  they	  arrive,	  that	  
there	  will	  be	  enough	  grazing	  and	  water	  for	  them	  during	  their	  stay,	  that	  they	  will	  be	  protected	  from	  theft	  or	  
damage	  while	  there,	  that	  their	  journey	  back	  will	  be	  safe	  –	  and	  that	  they	  will	  reliably	  be	  able	  to	  repeat	  the	  
process	  every	  year	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future.	  Those	  objectives	  might	  be	  achieved	  by	  developing	  and	  
maintaining	  relationships	  of	  trust	  with	  all	  the	  individuals	  and	  communities	  able	  to	  affect	  this	  aspect	  of	  their	  
livelihoods	  across	  their	  lifetimes.	  Such	  personal	  relationships	  are,	  however,	  time-­‐consuming	  to	  construct	  and	  
sustain,	  and	  inherently	  unstable,	  providing	  neither	  certain	  protection	  against	  risk	  nor	  reliable	  compensation	  
against	  loss.	  Structuring	  the	  collective	  exploitation	  of	  distant	  pastures	  in	  terms	  of	  property	  rights	  offers	  a	  
practical,	  sustainable	  mitigation	  of	  those	  risks.	  The	  security	  for	  each	  individual	  in	  the	  articulation	  of	  access	  to	  
those	  grasslands	  as	  socially-­‐recognised	  rights	  of	  property	  lies	  in	  his/her	  reasonable	  expectation	  that	  the	  
wider	  community	  will	  ‘prevent	  others	  from	  interfering	  with	  his	  actions,	  provided	  that	  these	  actions	  are	  not	  
prohibited	  in	  the	  specifications	  of	  his	  rights’	  (Demsetz	  1967,	  347).	  	  
Anthropologists	  and	  other	  social	  scientists	  define	  property	  rights	  in	  terms	  of	  bundles	  of	  legal	  rights	  of	  action	  
over	  an	  object,	  resource	  or	  area,	  although	  the	  detailed	  conceptualization	  of	  those	  rights	  is	  culturally	  and	  
historically	  variable	  (e.g.	  Demsetz	  1967,	  354;	  Alchian	  and	  Demsetz	  1973,	  17;	  Schlager	  and	  Östrom	  1992;	  
Holling	  2001;	  Lu	  2001;	  Carruthers	  and	  Ariovich	  2004,	  23-­‐4;	  Stiltz	  2011).	  In	  the	  terms	  of	  this	  general	  
definition,	  a	  man	  who	  says	  that	  he	  owns	  all	  that	  he	  surveys	  –	  or	  that	  he	  has	  rights	  of	  property	  in	  a	  shared	  
natural	  resource	  -­‐	  is	  referring	  to	  a	  set	  of	  rights	  to	  use	  an	  object,	  area	  or	  resource	  in	  specific,	  clearly-­‐defined	  
ways	  that	  are	  recognised	  and	  defended	  by	  society	  at	  large.	  It	  follows	  that	  the	  principal	  aim	  of	  governance	  is	  
the	  recognition	  and	  defence	  of	  those	  rights.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  property	  rights	  are	  demonstrated,	  then	  their	  
governance	  is	  implied.	  For	  example,	  the	  Iron	  Age	  ringworks	  at	  Stonea	  Camp,	  in	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  fen	  basin,	  
and	  at	  Tattershall	  Thorpe,	  on	  its	  north-­‐west	  edge,	  have	  each	  been	  interpreted	  as	  sub-­‐regional	  central	  places	  
for	  seasonal	  assemblies	  whose	  timing	  was	  closely	  connected	  with	  the	  management	  and	  exploitation	  of	  
common	  grazing	  (Malim	  1992;	  Chowne,	  Girling	  and	  Greig	  1986,	  184-­‐5;	  also	  Evans	  2003,	  268;	  Evans	  1992,	  
25).	  If	  the	  cattle	  pastured	  on	  these	  wetlands	  were	  the	  physical	  expression	  of	  property	  rights	  shared	  by	  
discrete	  groups	  of	  communities,	  then	  it	  would	  be	  reasonable	  to	  extend	  that	  interpretation	  by	  inferring	  that	  
the	  governance	  of	  those	  rights	  was	  at	  least	  one	  object	  of	  the	  seasonal	  assemblies	  at	  these	  ringworks.	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The	  implications	  of	  common	  property	  rights	  for	  structures	  of	  governance	  	  
Can	  specific	  forms	  of	  governance	  be	  inferred	  from	  specific	  forms	  of	  property	  right?	  There	  are	  at	  least	  two	  
significant	  problems	  in	  extrapolating	  forms	  of	  political	  structure	  from	  the	  archaeological	  demonstration	  of	  
generalized	  rights	  of	  private	  or	  public	  property.	  The	  first	  relates	  to	  the	  inherent	  instability	  of	  such	  rights,	  
which	  can	  for	  any	  number	  of	  unpredictable,	  idiosyncratic	  reasons	  be	  acquired	  or	  alienated	  at	  will,	  
amalgamated	  with	  others,	  or	  subdivided.	  The	  second	  is	  that	  both	  can	  be	  found	  in	  societies	  with	  widely	  
varying	  structures	  of	  governance,	  whether	  ruled	  by	  kings,	  religious	  leaders,	  war	  lords,	  clan	  chiefs,	  dictators,	  
oligarchies,	  parliamentary	  democracies	  and	  so	  on.	  It	  is	  therefore	  it	  difficult	  to	  predict	  specific	  forms	  of	  
governance	  from	  the	  archaeological	  demonstration	  of	  rights	  of	  property	  held	  either	  exclusively	  by	  
individuals	  or	  by	  the	  entire	  population	  of	  a	  polity.	  
There	  is,	  by	  contrast,	  significant	  predictability	  in	  the	  structure	  and	  character	  of	  the	  governance	  of	  rights	  of	  
common	  property.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  mutual	  objectives	  of	  all	  right-­‐holders	  in	  a	  shared	  resource	  run	  a	  high	  
risk	  of	  being	  affected	  by	  all,	  or	  almost	  all,	  the	  actions	  of	  others	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  resource:	  the	  equitable	  
distribution	  of	  the	  resource	  among	  them,	  and	  a	  managed	  balance	  between	  the	  short-­‐term	  maximization	  of	  
its	  output	  and	  its	  long-­‐term	  sustainability.	  Östrom,	  whose	  work	  on	  commons	  was	  awarded	  the	  Nobel	  prize	  
for	  economics	  in	  2009,	  developed	  the	  term	  common	  property	  regimes	  (hereafter	  CPrRs)	  to	  describe	  the	  
institutions	  through	  which	  rights	  of	  common	  property	  are	  governed	  in	  pursuit	  of	  those	  objectives.	  She	  
suggested	  that	  CPrRs	  are	  framed	  by	  seven	  general	  but	  distinctive	  design	  principles	  whatever	  their	  cultural	  or	  
chronological	  contexts:	  	  
• the	  restriction	  of	  rights	  of	  common	  in	  a	  defined	  resource	  to	  an	  exclusive	  group;	  	  
• equitable	  rights	  of	  participation	  of	  all	  right-­‐holders	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  the	  resource;	  	  
• an	  expectation	  that	  all	  right-­‐holders	  will	  attend	  and	  participate	  in	  all	  meetings	  of	  a	  CPrR;	  	  
• decision-­‐making	  by	  consensus;	  	  
• transparency	  and	  accountability	  in	  governance;	  	  
• records	  of	  decisions	  in	  collective	  oral	  traditions	  of	  custom	  and	  practice;	  	  
• and	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  ‘moral	  economy’	  –	  that	  no	  right-­‐holder	  should	  profit	  from	  a	  common	  right	  at	  
the	  expense	  of	  other	  right-­‐holders	  once	  his	  subsistence	  needs	  have	  been	  met	  (Östrom	  1990,	  90-­‐
102).	  	  
The	  abstract	  nature	  of	  these	  principles	  minimizes	  the	  risk	  of	  institutional	  failure	  since	  they	  allow	  CPrRs	  to	  
operate	  in	  and	  adapt	  to	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  contexts	  and	  forms	  over	  time.	  While	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  they	  define	  
predictable,	  orderly,	  normative	  limits	  to	  the	  generalized	  objectives	  at	  which	  governance	  must,	  may	  and	  must	  
not	  be	  aimed,	  on	  the	  other	  their	  lack	  of	  detail	  allows	  considerable	  flexibility	  in	  their	  interpretation	  on	  the	  
ground	  in	  response	  to	  changing	  external	  and	  internal	  environmental,	  cultural	  and	  social	  influences	  (Hayden	  
and	  Cannon	  1982,	  134;	  Östrom	  1986,	  5;	  1990,	  90;	  Holling	  2001,	  399).	  For	  example,	  a	  particular	  CPrR	  may	  
make	  changes	  to	  its	  regulations	  about	  who	  may	  be	  admitted	  to	  common	  rights	  but	  there	  will	  be	  no	  
amendment	  of	  the	  overarching	  principle	  that	  rights	  of	  common	  property	  belong	  to	  an	  exclusive	  group;	  or	  it	  
may	  agree	  adjustments	  to	  the	  boundaries	  of	  a	  resource,	  but	  there	  will	  be	  no	  question	  of	  their	  complete	  
removal.	  By	  reserving	  governance	  of	  local	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  issues	  of	  resource	  allocation,	  regulation	  and	  
management	  to	  regular	  assemblies	  of	  individual	  CPrRs,	  the	  flexibility	  and	  responsiveness	  of	  broader	  
principles	  of	  collective	  governance	  offers	  the	  potential	  for	  a	  CPrR	  to	  meet	  its	  underlying	  objectives	  
continuously	  over	  long	  periods	  of	  time.	  CPrRs	  are	  thus	  structured	  for	  survival	  and	  adaptability	  across	  the	  
longue	  durée	  (e.g.	  Bourdieu	  1977;	  Braudel	  1982;	  Holling	  2001;	  Folke	  2006;	  Plielinger	  and	  Bieling	  2012).	  
It	  follows	  that,	  where	  archaeologists	  have	  interpreted	  areas	  of	  land	  as	  a	  shared	  resource	  exploited	  by	  
defined	  groups	  of	  individuals	  and/or	  communities,	  those	  who	  accessed	  such	  resources	  did	  so	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
legally	  defined	  rights	  of	  common	  property	  governed	  under	  a	  CPrR	  in	  which	  they	  were	  all	  members,	  and	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which	  had	  predictable	  operational	  characteristics	  (e.g.	  Fleming	  2008,	  85-­‐90;	  Herring	  2008;	  Oosthuizen	  2011;	  
2013a;	  2013b).	  To	  take	  a	  fenland	  example:	  the	  excavators	  of	  Borough	  Fen,	  a	  permanently	  occupied	  later	  Iron	  
Age	  ringwork	  on	  the	  western	  fen-­‐edge,	  suggested	  that	  it	  was	  a	  ‘tribal’	  centre	  deliberately	  located	  to	  
dominate	  the	  surrounding	  landscape	  (Malim	  and	  McKenna	  1993,	  61;	  see	  also	  Hall	  1987,	  26-­‐28).	  Its	  functions,	  
they	  concluded,	  were	  to	  oversee	  the	  management	  of	  the	  communal	  herds	  that	  grazed	  on	  the	  fen	  pastures	  in	  
summer	  and	  to	  provide	  a	  focus	  for	  the	  autumn	  roundup.	  It	  follows	  from	  the	  preceding	  discussion	  that,	  if	  
there	  was	  collective	  grazing	  on	  the	  fen	  and	  if	  it	  was	  managed	  from	  the	  ringwork,	  then	  Borough	  Fen	  was	  a	  
centre	  for	  the	  governance	  under	  a	  CPrR	  of	  rights	  of	  common	  property	  in	  the	  wetlands.	  The	  seasonal	  
assemblies	  that	  were	  held	  there	  for	  the	  collective	  governance	  of	  the	  fen	  and	  the	  stock	  that	  grazed	  it	  could	  
reasonably	  be	  expected	  to	  have,	  for	  example,	  controlled	  access	  to	  rights	  of	  common,	  formulated	  regulations	  
for	  its	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  management,	  agreed	  graduated	  systems	  of	  enforceable	  sanctions	  to	  ensure	  compliance,	  
and	  established	  formal	  mechanisms	  for	  resolving	  disputes.	  Unless	  regulations	  were	  agreed	  from	  first	  
principles	  each	  year	  (a	  time-­‐consuming	  process	  for	  decisions	  reached	  by	  consensus),	  bylaws	  were	  preserved	  
in	  oral	  traditions	  of	  custom	  and	  practice.	  	  
	  
	  Collective	  ‘horizontal’	  governance	  and	  ‘vertical’	  hierarchical	  governance	  	  
One	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  implications	  of	  a	  common	  property	  rights	  approach	  is	  the	  characteristic	  equity	  of	  
right-­‐holders	  of	  otherwise	  different	  rank,	  status	  and/or	  wealth	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  a	  CPrR	  and	  in	  their	  
access	  to	  its	  resources.	  Collective	  governance	  might	  thus	  be	  characterized	  as	  ‘horizontal’	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  
‘vertical’	  governance	  of	  hierarchies	  in	  which	  access	  to	  power	  is	  directly	  proportional	  to	  an	  individual’s	  place	  
in	  the	  pecking	  order	  (e.g.,	  Reynolds	  1984;	  Östrom	  1986,	  1990;	  Feinman	  2000;	  Stafford,	  Nelson	  and	  
Martindale	  2001,	  3;	  Fargher	  and	  Blanton	  2007).	  This	  paper	  does	  not	  argue	  that	  evidence	  for	  a	  CPrR	  should	  
be	  taken	  to	  imply	  a	  wider	  prelapsarian	  egalitarianism,	  or	  a	  utopian	  lack	  of	  conflict,	  or	  that	  CPrRs	  were	  an	  
unsophisticated	  precursor	  of	  ‘more	  complex’	  hierarchical	  polities.	  Instead,	  it	  recognises	  that	  CPrRs	  did	  not	  
exist	  in	  an	  organizational	  vacuum.	  They	  were	  an	  aspect	  of	  complex	  social	  organisations	  of	  which	  at	  least	  
some	  features	  were	  likely	  to	  be	  hierarchical.	  Indeed,	  the	  central	  contention	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  that	  the	  specific	  
conditions	  within	  which	  CPrRs	  are	  formed	  allow	  them	  to	  co-­‐exist	  with,	  complement	  and	  thus	  enrich	  existing	  
and/or	  emerging	  ‘vertical’	  hierarchies	  of	  all	  kinds,	  whether	  social,	  religious,	  political	  or	  economic.	  In	  this	  
CPrRs	  illuminate	  discussions	  of	  heterarchy	  -­‐	  ‘the	  relation	  of	  elements	  to	  one	  another	  when	  they	  are	  
unranked,	  or	  when	  they	  possess	  the	  potential	  for	  being	  ranked	  in	  a	  number	  of	  different	  ways’	  –	  which	  
usually	  focus	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  multiple	  hierarchies	  within	  a	  culture	  (Crumley	  2005,	  39;	  see	  also	  
Ehrenreich,	  Crumley	  and	  Levy	  1995).	  Shared	  property	  rights	  focus	  attention	  on	  the	  co-­‐existence	  of	  ‘vertical’	  
hierarchies	  of	  all	  kinds	  with	  the	  ‘horizontality’	  in	  membership	  and	  governance	  of	  CPrRs.	  	  
Figures	  2a	  and	  2b	  about	  here	  
The	  utility	  of	  CPrRs	  as	  an	  analytical	  tool	  alongside	  hierarchical	  models	  in	  archaeological	  explanation	  lies	  in	  
their	  reminder	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  structured	  mutuality	  in	  social	  relations.	  They	  provide	  opportunities	  for	  
individuals	  to	  create	  personal	  relationships	  characterized	  by	  reciprocal	  obligation	  with	  others	  of	  greater	  or	  
lesser	  wealth,	  rank	  and/or	  status,	  through	  gifts	  or	  favours	  in	  kind,	  patronage	  or	  labour	  as	  well	  as	  through	  
feasting,	  markets,	  religious	  ceremonies,	  family	  meetings	  and	  so	  on.	  Such	  connections	  between	  individuals	  
strengthen	  and	  enrich	  the	  formal	  and	  informal	  relationships	  that	  bind	  holders	  of	  property	  rights	  to	  their	  
communities	  and	  locate	  them	  within	  ‘vertical’	  hierarchies	  of	  all	  kinds	  (e.g.	  Locke,	  Gosden	  and	  Daly	  2005,	  
133-­‐151;	  Evans	  and	  Hodder	  2006,	  336).	  	  
An	  illustration	  of	  the	  argument	  may	  be	  found	  in	  the	  Iron	  Age	  ringwork	  at	  Wardy	  Hill	  that,	  Evans	  (2003)	  
suggests,	  was	  the	  political	  centre	  of	  a	  territory	  extending	  across	  the	  Isle	  of	  Ely.	  Within	  the	  ringwork,	  which	  
overlooked	  and	  controlled	  substantial	  areas	  of	  shared	  summer	  pasture	  on	  the	  fen,	  there	  was	  a	  large	  space	  
that	  appeared	  to	  have	  been	  used	  for	  seasonal	  public	  assemblies,	  including	  vast	  feasts.	  Such	  events	  may	  have	  
been	  focused	  on	  the	  collective	  negotiation	  of	  ‘social	  rights	  and	  duties	  …	  and	  …	  the	  ‘performance’	  of	  tithe	  and	  
tribute’	  by	  kin-­‐based	  communities	  who	  came	  together	  for	  these	  purposes	  (Evans	  2003,	  255,	  my	  amendment;	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see	  also	  Pryor	  1998,	  351-­‐364).	  If	  the	  ringwork	  was	  a	  territorial	  centre,	  and	  if	  access	  to	  adjacent	  fen	  grazing	  
was	  restricted	  to	  exclusive	  groups	  of	  kin	  who	  did	  indeed	  meet	  there	  in	  regular	  assemblies,	  then	  a	  common	  
property	  rights	  approach	  might	  reasonably	  be	  employed	  to	  infer	  further	  detail.	  For	  example,	  it	  might	  be	  
suggested	  that	  the	  ‘horizontal’	  social	  relations	  embedded	  in	  the	  CPrR	  governing	  the	  pastures	  braided	  
individuals,	  each	  with	  other	  local	  and	  regional	  loyalties	  to	  family	  and	  kin,	  and	  to	  their	  wider	  communities,	  
into	  a	  territorial	  polity	  whose	  summer	  pastures	  provided	  common	  grazing	  for	  them	  all.	  It	  offers	  an	  example	  
of	  how	  interpretations	  based	  on	  models	  of	  ‘vertically’-­‐structured,	  hierarchical	  social	  relations	  –	  whether	  
static	  or	  changing	  -­‐	  might	  be	  enhanced	  by	  the	  additional	  recognition	  of	  the	  complexity	  of	  personal	  
relationships	  implicit	  in	  ‘horizontal’	  CPrRs:	  between	  landholders,	  their	  kin,	  their	  local	  communities,	  elites	  and	  
their	  rulers	  (Figures	  2a	  and	  2b;	  Holling	  2001;	  Plielinger	  and	  Bieling	  2012).	  	  
	  
Structured	  forms	  of	  social	  relations	  implicit	  in	  rights	  of	  common	  property	  	  
Three	  implications	  for	  the	  practical	  details	  of	  social	  relations	  between	  individual	  landholders	  and	  their	  
communities	  follow.	  
First,	  a	  political	  territory	  is	  an	  area	  of	  land	  in	  and	  over	  which	  a	  defined	  group	  of	  people	  have	  exclusive	  rights	  
of	  property	  of	  all	  kinds.	  Since	  common	  property	  rights	  connect	  an	  individual	  with	  other	  landholders	  across	  
the	  largest	  CPrR	  of	  which	  he	  is	  a	  member,	  some	  polities	  and	  their	  sub-­‐regions	  may	  be	  identified	  from	  rights	  
of	  common	  linking	  specific	  communities	  with	  defined,	  shared	  natural	  resources	  (e.g.	  Reynolds	  1984,	  111).	  
Such	  connections	  may	  be	  simplex	  -­‐	  based	  on	  rights	  of	  common	  property	  in	  a	  single	  resource	  exploited	  by	  
right-­‐holders	  across	  an	  entire	  territory;	  or	  they	  may	  be	  complex,	  as	  in	  cases	  where	  an	  individual	  owns	  
common	  rights	  in	  a	  range	  of	  local,	  sub-­‐regional,	  regional	  and/or	  territorial	  resources.	  Figure	  3	  shows	  the	  
argument	  in	  principle:	  an	  individual	  has	  rights	  of	  common	  (shown	  as	  a	  star)	  in	  –	  and	  hence	  participates	  in	  the	  
governance	  of	  –	  common	  woodland	  in	  his	  own	  locality;	  in	  shared	  grassland	  with	  right-­‐holders	  from	  his	  and	  a	  
neighbouring	  locality;	  in	  sub-­‐regional	  shared	  grassland	  with	  right-­‐holders	  from	  other	  localities;	  in	  common	  
regional	  wood	  pasture	  with	  right-­‐holders	  from	  other	  sub-­‐regions;	  and	  in	  territorial	  common	  pasture	  with	  
right-­‐holders	  from	  other	  regions	  (e.g.	  Reynolds	  1984,	  138-­‐9).	  
Figure	  3	  about	  here	  
The	  definition	  of	  territories	  in	  entwined	  social	  and	  environmental	  terms	  of	  polity	  and	  shared	  resource	  has	  
allowed	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  prehistoric,	  Roman	  and	  early	  medieval	  territorial	  units	  across	  England	  (e.g.	  
Neilson	  1928,	  3;	  Joliffe	  1933,	  54-­‐6;	  Hooke	  1981,	  160,	  144;	  Jones	  1987,	  29-­‐32;	  Ford	  1987,	  150;	  Lewis,	  
Mitchell-­‐Fox	  and	  Dyer	  1997,	  55-­‐6;	  Fleming	  1998,	  56;	  Herring	  et	  al.	  2011).	  There	  is,	  for	  instance,	  general	  
agreement	  that	  medieval	  CPrRs	  around	  the	  edges	  of	  the	  East	  Anglian	  fen	  basin,	  each	  focused	  on	  an	  exclusive	  
area	  of	  wetland	  grazing,	  preserved	  the	  geographies	  of	  early	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  polities	  whose	  territories	  included	  
both	  those	  extensive	  commons	  and	  the	  uplands	  from	  which	  they	  were	  exploited	  (Neilson	  1920,	  xlix-­‐lviii;	  
Roffe	  1993,	  83;	  Roffe	  2005,	  268;	  Oosthuizen	  2016a;	  Figure	  4).	  That	  is,	  if	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  identify	  areas	  subject	  
to	  rights	  of	  common	  it	  may	  also	  be	  possible	  to	  identify	  the	  territorial	  units	  within	  which	  they	  lay.	  
Figure	  4	  about	  here	  
The	  second	  implication	  is	  illustrated	  in	  the	  consensus	  that	  British	  political	  identity	  from	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  
first	  millennium	  BC	  until	  at	  least	  the	  later	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  period	  was	  conceptualized	  in	  terms	  of	  control	  of	  
defined	  territories	  by	  groups	  of	  (real	  or	  constructed)	  kin	  claiming	  descent	  from	  a	  (real	  or	  mythical)	  common	  
ancestor	  (Neilson	  1920,	  43-­‐7,	  68;	  Charles-­‐Edwards	  1972,	  3-­‐4;	  Gosden	  1985;	  Härke	  1997,	  137;	  Cunliffe	  2010,	  
30,	  605;	  Charles-­‐Edwards	  2014).	  Reynolds	  has	  suggested	  that	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  such	  polities	  were	  so	  
often	  rationalized	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘communities	  of	  common	  descent’	  since	  the	  mutual	  obligations,	  
responsibilities	  and	  rights	  integral	  to	  CPrRs,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  shared	  oral	  traditions	  of	  custom	  and	  practice,	  are	  
also	  aspects	  of	  relationships	  between	  kin	  (1983,	  381).	  In	  other	  words,	  intersections	  between	  territoriality,	  
landholding,	  rights	  of	  common,	  and	  collective	  governance	  that	  are	  visible	  in	  CPrRs	  may	  in	  many	  cases	  have	  
been	  mediated	  in	  terms	  of	  kinship.	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This	  brings	  us	  to	  the	  third	  implication,	  embedded	  in	  the	  characteristic	  limitation	  of	  rights	  of	  common	  
property	  to	  an	  exclusive	  group.	  It	  can	  be	  exemplified	  in	  early	  medieval	  Britain	  -­‐	  and	  perhaps	  much	  earlier	  -­‐	  in	  
the	  restriction	  of	  access	  to	  property	  rights	  to	  those	  who	  satisfied	  conditions	  of	  status.	  Applicants	  were	  
required	  to	  be	  members	  of	  the	  kin	  group,	  whether	  that	  status	  was	  inherited	  or	  acquired,	  and	  they	  had	  to	  be	  
of	  free	  status,	  whether	  inherited	  or	  acquired	  (e.g.	  Charles-­‐Edwards	  1972,	  5-­‐9;	  Gosden	  1985,	  481;	  Härke	  
1997,	  137).	  Access	  to	  rights	  of	  property	  was	  a	  mark	  of	  both	  individual	  and	  wider	  social	  status,	  however	  ill-­‐
defined	  the	  lower	  boundaries	  of	  either	  might	  be.	  Property	  acquired	  in	  this	  way	  was	  made	  up	  of	  two	  
inextricably	  interlocked	  components:	  an	  independently-­‐cultivated	  landholding	  and	  rights	  of	  common	  in	  
shared	  resources.	  It	  was	  subject	  to	  concomitant	  legal	  obligations	  to	  the	  territory	  as	  a	  whole:	  the	  expectation	  
of	  participation	  in	  collective	  governance	  at	  all	  levels,	  membership	  of	  a	  communal	  militia,	  and	  contributions	  
of	  characteristic	  public	  renders,	  services	  and	  money	  payments.	  Faith	  has	  emphasised	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  
‘the	  idea	  of	  ‘law-­‐worthiness’,	  of	  entitlement	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  system,	  was	  of	  paramount	  importance	  to	  
personal	  status’	  in	  early	  medieval	  England	  (1997,	  117).	  Gosden’s	  epigram	  -­‐	  ‘a	  political	  system	  in	  the	  idiom	  of	  
kinship’	  –	  describes	  a	  similar	  case	  for	  late	  prehistoric	  Britain	  (1985,	  480).	  Both	  indicate	  that,	  where	  there	  is	  
archaeological	  evidence	  for	  shared	  rights	  in	  natural	  resources,	  the	  possibility	  might	  also	  be	  considered	  of	  a	  
minimum	  social	  position	  for	  landholders	  whose	  social	  identity	  was	  based	  at	  least	  in	  part	  on	  their	  access	  to	  
rights	  of	  common	  property,	  participation	  in	  the	  collective	  governance	  of	  shared	  resources,	  mutual	  
obligations	  and	  reciprocities	  within	  a	  CPrR,	  and	  legal	  responsibilities	  exercised	  across	  the	  polity	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  
	  
Common	  rights	  and	  the	  longue	  durée	  	  
Four	  aspects	  of	  CPrRs	  suggest	  that	  they	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  persist	  for	  considerable	  periods.	  First,	  the	  
individual	  lifespans	  of	  their	  members	  do	  not	  limit	  the	  longevity	  of	  a	  CPrR	  unless	  it	  is	  specifically	  constructed	  
in	  that	  way.	  Second,	  the	  principles	  on	  which	  CPrRs	  are	  based	  are	  so	  generalized	  that	  they	  allow	  sufficient	  
flexibility	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  detail	  of	  almost	  any	  changing	  circumstance.	  Third,	  this	  form	  of	  governance	  is	  
inherently	  conservative	  and	  risk	  averse	  since	  common	  rights	  are	  legal	  rights	  whose	  amendment	  requires	  the	  
collective	  assent	  of	  all	  right	  holders.	  And	  finally,	  because	  the	  values	  of	  reciprocity	  and	  mutuality	  that	  
underpin	  CPrRs	  are	  also	  those	  that	  characterise	  relationships	  between	  kin,	  they	  are	  ‘systems	  of	  social	  
behavior	  which	  provide	  a	  framework	  over	  the	  longue	  durée	  within	  which	  the	  individual	  can	  operate	  [while]	  
safeguarding	  …	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  community,	  and	  thus	  its	  power	  to	  reproduce	  itself’	  (Cunliffe	  2010,	  681;	  
see	  also	  Bourdieu	  1977;	  Holling	  2001,	  398).	  	  
Palynological	  evidence	  of	  the	  stability	  from	  prehistory	  into	  the	  middle	  ages	  of	  mosaics	  of	  grassland	  species	  
on	  areas	  of	  long-­‐standing	  common	  pasture	  illustrates	  the	  longevity	  of	  some	  CPrRs.	  On	  the	  Cheviot	  Hills,	  for	  
example,	  the	  character	  of	  high	  quality,	  species-­‐rich	  grassland	  collectively	  grazed	  from	  the	  Iron	  Age	  until	  the	  
mid-­‐eighteenth	  century	  remained	  unchanged	  across	  at	  least	  two	  millennia	  (Davies	  and	  Dixon	  2007,	  29,	  38).	  
So	  too,	  ‘the	  vegetation	  of	  [Bodmin]	  moor	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  very	  similar	  [from	  the	  Iron	  Age]	  throughout	  
the	  first	  millennium	  AD,	  with	  predominantly	  pastoral	  land	  use,	  plus	  some	  grassland	  management	  for	  hay’	  
(Gearey,	  Charman	  and	  Kent	  2000,	  56,	  my	  addition).	  Because	  environmental	  systems	  are	  not	  naturally	  static,	  
such	  stability	  can	  only	  have	  been	  the	  result	  of	  continuous,	  long-­‐term	  and	  deliberate	  management	  by	  the	  
CPrRs	  that	  governed	  these	  commons.	  Such	  examples	  illustrate	  O’Connor’s	  proposition	  that	  ‘in	  at	  least	  some	  
cases,	  that	  [long-­‐term]	  constancy	  was	  deliberate,	  and	  what	  we	  are	  detecting	  (and	  largely	  ignoring)	  is	  quite	  
deliberate	  management	  of	  the	  landscape	  to	  maintain	  that	  landscape	  as	  it	  ought	  to	  be’	  (2009,	  11,	  my	  
addition).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  pasture	  managed	  as	  a	  shared	  resource,	  that	  management	  is	  most	  likely	  to	  have	  been	  
undertaken	  within	  a	  CPrR.	  Similar	  long-­‐term	  continuities	  have	  been	  identified	  across	  all	  periods	  and	  cultures	  
(e.g.	  Netting	  1976;	  Östrom	  1990,	  58-­‐102;	  Oosthuizen	  2011;	  2013b,	  24-­‐43;	  Plielinger	  and	  Bieling	  2012,	  126-­‐
145	  and	  242-­‐260).	  
The	  evidence	  for	  the	  persistence	  for	  centuries	  or	  even	  millennia	  of	  structures	  of	  ‘horizontal’	  governance	  
over	  shared	  natural	  resources	  is	  not	  surprising,	  since	  the	  generalized	  principles	  on	  which	  CPrRs	  are	  
structured	  underpin	  their	  elastic	  capacity	  to	  adapt	  to	  both	  extrinsic	  and	  intrinsic	  influences	  and	  processes,	  as	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well	  as	  to	  transformations	  in	  the	  ‘vertical’	  social,	  political	  and	  economic	  hierarchies	  that	  they	  
complemented.	  They	  exemplify	  Hollings’	  widely	  adopted	  vision	  of	  how	  ‘a	  healthy	  social-­‐ecological	  system	  
can	  invent	  and	  experiment,	  benefitting	  from	  inventions	  that	  create	  opportunity	  while	  it	  is	  kept	  safe	  from	  
those	  that	  destablise	  the	  system	  because	  of	  their	  nature	  or	  excessive	  exuberance’	  (2001,	  399).	  The	  
adaptability	  of	  CPrRs	  for	  the	  collective	  governance,	  management	  and	  exploitation	  of	  fenland	  resources	  may	  
explain	  both	  the	  long-­‐term	  ecological	  stability	  of	  the	  region	  and	  consistent	  evidence	  over	  six	  millenia	  for	  
shared	  grazing	  on	  its	  pastures	  despite	  consistent,	  sometimes	  substantial,	  changes	  in	  material	  culture	  and	  
social	  organisation	  (Figures	  1b	  and	  4,	  Illustration	  1).	  Although	  the	  causewayed	  enclosures	  of	  the	  Neolithic	  
fenland	  described	  above	  eventually	  fell	  out	  of	  use,	  archaeologists	  suggest	  that	  commoning	  persisted	  and	  
assemblies	  for	  its	  governance	  moved	  to	  Bronze	  Age	  stockyards	  -­‐	  and,	  when	  they,	  too,	  became	  redundant,	  to	  
Iron	  Age	  ringworks.	  By	  the	  early	  middle	  ages	  assemblies	  continued	  to	  be	  held	  on	  commons	  or	  near	  their	  
boundaries	  as,	  for	  example,	  at	  a	  lost	  site	  called	  Modich	  ‘deep	  into	  the	  marshy	  no-­‐man’s-­‐land	  between	  the	  
island	  of	  Ely	  and	  the	  northern	  group	  of	  villages	  about	  Wisbech’	  (Miller	  1951,	  32).	  	  
Scepticism	  about	  such	  continuity	  is	  predicated	  on	  disruptions	  to	  social	  stability,	  most	  often	  (in	  archaeological	  
terms)	  expressed	  in	  changes	  in	  material	  culture.	  How	  might	  breaks	  in	  the	  collective	  governance	  of	  rights	  of	  
common	  property	  be	  explained?	  First,	  an	  hiatus	  where	  there	  is	  no	  ecological	  evidence	  of	  disruption	  to	  the	  
character	  of	  a	  natural	  resource	  might	  be	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  takeover	  of	  a	  continuing	  CPrR	  by	  a	  
completely	  new	  membership.	  It	  requires	  the	  transfer,	  within	  a	  brief	  period	  and	  without	  interruption	  to	  the	  
CPrR,	  of	  all	  existing	  rights	  of	  property	  in	  the	  resource	  to	  a	  set	  of	  individuals	  who	  had	  not	  previously	  been	  
involved	  in	  the	  CPrR	  and	  who	  were	  ignorant	  of	  its	  workings	  (for	  example,	  in	  the	  displacement	  of	  an	  existing	  
population	  by	  incomers).	  This	  is	  a	  particularly	  complicated	  explanation.	  The	  success	  of	  the	  model	  depends	  
on	  the	  efficient	  transmission	  from	  the	  original	  group	  to	  its	  successors	  within	  a	  short	  length	  of	  time	  of	  all	  
existing	  institutional	  knowledge,	  built	  up	  over	  a	  long	  period	  and	  held	  in	  oral	  traditions	  of	  custom	  and	  
practice,	  including	  such	  key	  practical	  elements	  as	  the	  finer	  detail	  of	  territorial	  boundaries	  and	  the	  subtle	  
knowledge	  of	  local	  soils,	  topography,	  drainage	  and	  growing	  conditions	  required	  for	  successful	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  
management	  of	  a	  resource.	  	  
An	  alternative	  explanation	  might	  propose	  that	  all	  existing	  CPrRs	  were	  abolished	  and	  replaced	  by	  entirely	  
new	  ones	  over	  the	  same	  resources.	  That	  is	  similarly	  complicated	  explanation.	  It	  depends	  on	  the	  complete	  
loss	  of	  all	  property	  rights	  including	  the	  cessation	  of	  all	  common	  rights,	  lack	  of	  any	  memory	  of	  previous	  CPrRs,	  
and	  then	  their	  later	  re-­‐emergence.	  Loss	  of	  all	  institutional	  memory	  would	  involve	  at	  least	  a	  generation	  of	  
abandonment	  to	  allow	  not	  only	  for	  the	  location	  and	  boundaries	  of	  a	  resource	  to	  be	  forgotten	  but	  also,	  more	  
importantly,	  for	  the	  detailed	  arrangements	  of	  the	  previous	  CPrR	  also	  to	  be	  forgotten.	  A	  generation	  of	  
desertion	  is	  long	  enough	  for	  woodland	  to	  regenerate	  on	  previously	  open	  land	  or	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  fens)	  for	  
succession	  to	  woodland	  in	  some	  of	  its	  drier	  areas.	  By	  and	  large,	  there	  is	  relatively	  little	  evidence	  of	  such	  
abandonment	  across	  Britain	  at	  any	  time	  after	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  first	  millennium	  BC.	  
This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  such	  explanations	  are	  never	  viable.	  However,	  where	  evidence	  to	  support	  them	  is	  
lacking,	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  adopt	  the	  most	  straightforward	  interpretation	  of	  the	  absence	  of	  that	  evidence	  –	  
that	  rights	  of	  common	  property	  and	  the	  CPrRs	  that	  governed	  them	  were,	  more	  often	  that	  not,	  characterized	  
by	  continuity	  as	  they	  adapted	  to	  new	  circumstances	  across	  the	  longue	  durée	  (Oosthuizen	  2016b).	  There	  is	  an	  
intuitive	  sense	  to	  this	  conclusion	  since	  agricultural	  subsistence	  from	  one	  year	  to	  the	  next	  depended	  at	  least	  
in	  part	  on	  the	  continuous	  exploitation	  of	  such	  resources.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
The	  preceding	  pages	  have	  argued	  that	  specific	  aspects	  of	  social	  organisation	  can	  be	  predicted	  where	  there	  is	  
evidence	  that	  individuals	  or	  communities	  owned	  and	  exercised	  rights	  of	  common	  property	  over	  a	  natural	  
resource	  -­‐	  mostly	  importantly,	  that	  such	  collective	  rights	  were	  governed	  within	  a	  CPrR	  that	  had	  the	  potential	  
to	  exhibit	  considerable	  continuity	  across	  the	  longue	  durée.	  The	  distinctive	  characteristics	  of	  CPrRs	  offer	  
further	  granularity	  in	  predicting	  social	  relations	  and	  social	  identity:	  those	  holding	  rights	  of	  common	  property	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can	  be	  expected	  to	  have	  been	  active,	  equal	  participants	  in	  the	  collective	  governance	  of	  their	  rights;	  their	  
equitable	  rights	  of	  access	  to	  and	  exploitation	  of	  the	  resource	  they	  governed	  can	  similarly	  be	  inferred;	  since	  
the	  mutualities	  that	  are	  integral	  to	  collective	  governance	  are	  so	  similar	  to	  the	  rights	  and	  responsibilities	  
owed	  to	  and	  from	  kin,	  they	  predicate	  enriched	  models	  of	  social	  relationships	  across	  such	  ‘horizontal’	  forms	  
of	  governance	  whose	  members	  may	  otherwise	  have	  been	  of	  different	  rank,	  wealth	  and/or	  status;	  
governance	  of	  CPrRs	  was	  undertaken	  through	  regular,	  often	  seasonal,	  assemblies	  frequently	  accompanied	  
by	  feasting,	  markets,	  religious	  ceremonies,	  family	  meetings	  and	  so	  on;	  and	  that	  access	  to	  rights	  of	  property	  
and	  their	  concomitant	  obligations	  were	  marks	  of	  social	  distinction	  that	  implied	  a	  minimum	  status	  for	  
landholders.	  	  
If	  attendance	  and	  participation	  in	  ‘horizontal’	  CPrRs	  were	  integral	  to	  social	  identity,	  then	  common	  property	  
rights	  and	  their	  governance	  offer	  rich	  possibilities	  for	  exploring	  the	  detail	  not	  only	  of	  relationships	  between	  
households	  and	  their	  wider	  communities	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  shared	  resources,	  but	  also	  of	  their	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  September	  2015	  at	  the	  annual	  
conference	  of	  the	  European	  Association	  of	  Archaeologists.	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  Mr	  Peter	  Herring	  and	  other	  
participants	  for	  their	  helpful	  comments,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  of	  the	  anonymous	  referees.	  Figures	  1	  and	  4	  were	  
drawn	  by	  Mrs	  Sarah	  Wroot.	  
	  	  
References	  
Acheson,	  J.	  2011.	  Östrom	  for	  anthropologists.	  International	  Journal	  of	  the	  Commons	  5,	  2:	  319-­‐339.	  
Alchian,	  A.	  and	  H.	  Demsetz.	  1973.	  The	  property	  right	  paradigm.	  Journal	  of	  Economic	  History	  33:	  16-­‐27.	  
Bailey,	  M.	  2010.	  Beyond	  the	  Midland	  field	  system:	  the	  determinants	  of	  common	  rights	  over	  the	  arable	  in	  
medieval	  England.	  Agricultural	  History	  Review	  58,	  2:	  153-­‐71.	  
Bourdieu,	  P.	  1977.	  Outline	  of	  a	  Theory	  of	  Practice.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
Braudel,	  F.	  1982.	  On	  History.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	  
Carballo,	  D.,	  ed.	  2013.	  Cooperation	  and	  Collective	  Action.	  Boulder:	  University	  Press	  of	  Colorado.	  
Carballo,	  D.,	  P.	  Roscoe,	  and	  G.	  Feinman.	  2014.	  Cooperation	  and	  collective	  action	  in	  the	  cultural	  evolution	  of	  
complex	  societies.	  Journal	  of	  Archaeological	  Method	  and	  Theory	  21:	  98	  –	  133.	  
Carruthers,	  B.	  and	  L.	  Ariovich.	  2004.	  The	  sociology	  of	  property	  rights.	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Sociology	  30:	  23-­‐46.	  
Charles-­‐Edwards,	  T.	  1972.	  Kinship,	  status	  and	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  hide.	  Past	  and	  Present	  56:	  3-­‐33.	  
Charles-­‐Edwards,	  T.	  2014.	  Wales	  and	  the	  Britons,	  350-­‐1064.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
	  
Susan	  Oosthuizen,	  March	  2016	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Page	  9	  of	  12	  
	  	  
Chowne,	  P.,	  M.	  Girling,	  and	  J.	  Greig.	  1986.	  Excavations	  at	  an	  Iron	  Age	  defended	  enclosure	  at	  Tattershall	  
Thorpe,	  Lincolnshire.	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Prehistoric	  Society	  52:	  159-­‐88.	  	  
Crumley,	  C.	  2005.	  Remember	  how	  to	  organise:	  heterarchy	  across	  disciplines.	  In	  Nonlinear	  Models	  for	  
Archaeology	  and	  Anthropology,	  eds.	  C.	  Beekman	  and	  W.	  Baden,	  35-­‐50.	  Aldershot:	  Ashgate.	  
Cunliffe,	  B.	  2010.	  Iron	  Age	  Communities	  in	  Britain.	  London:	  Routledge.	  
Davies,	  A.	  and	  P.	  Dixon.	  2007.	  Reading	  the	  pastoral	  landscape:	  Palynological	  and	  historical	  evidence	  for	  the	  
impacts	  of	  long-­‐term	  grazing	  on	  Wether	  Hill,	  Ingram,	  Northumberland.	  Landscape	  History	  29:	  35–47.	  
Demsetz,	  H.	  1967.	  Toward	  a	  theory	  of	  property	  rights.	  American	  Economic	  Review	  57:	  347-­‐359.	  
Ehrenreich,	  R.,	  C.	  Crumley,	  and	  J.	  Levy,	  eds.	  1995.	  Heterarchy	  and	  the	  Analysis	  of	  Complex	  Societies.	  
Arlington:	  Archaeological	  Papers	  of	  the	  American	  Anthropological	  Association,	  Number	  6.	  	  
Evans,	  C.	  1992.	  Commanding	  gestures	  in	  lowlands:	  the	  investigation	  of	  two	  Iron	  Age	  Ringworks.	  Fenland	  
Research	  7:	  16-­‐34.	  
Evans,	  C.	  2003.	  Power	  and	  island	  communities:	  Excavations	  at	  the	  Wardy	  Hill	  ringwork,	  Coveney,	  Ely.	  East	  
Anglian	  Archaeology	  103.	  
Evans,	  C.	  and	  D.	  Serjeantson.	  1988.	  The	  backwater	  economy	  of	  a	  fen-­‐edge	  community	  in	  the	  Iron	  Age:	  the	  
Upper	  Delphs,	  Haddenham.	  Antiquity	  62,	  235:	  360-­‐170.	  
Evans,	  C.	  and	  I.	  Hodder.	  2006.	  Woodland	  Archaeology.	  Neolithic	  sites	  at	  Haddenham.	  Cambridge:	  McDonald	  
Institute	  Monographs.	  
Faith,	  R.	  1997.	  The	  English	  Peasantry	  and	  the	  Growth	  of	  Lordship.	  Leicester:	  Leicester	  University	  Press.	  
Fargher,	  L.	  F.	  2009.	  A	  comparison	  of	  the	  spatial	  distribution	  of	  agricultural	  and	  craft	  specialization	  in	  five	  
state-­‐level	  societies.	  Journal	  of	  Anthropological	  Research	  65:	  353	  –	  387.	  
Fargher,	  L.	  F.	  2010.	  Egalitarian	  ideology	  and	  political	  power	  in	  preHispanic	  central	  Mexico:	  The	  case	  of	  
Tlaxcallan.	  Latin	  American	  Antiquity	  21:	  227	  –	  251.	  
Fargher,	  L.	  F.,	  V.	  Espinoza,	  and	  R.	  Blanton.	  2011.	  Alternative	  pathways	  to	  power	  in	  late	  postclassic	  highland	  
Mesoamerica.	  Journal	  of	  Anthropological	  Archaeology	  30:	  306	  –	  326.	  
Feinman,	  G.	  2000.	  Political	  hierarchies	  and	  organizational	  strategies	  in	  the	  Publoan	  southwest.	  American	  
Antiquity	  65:	  449	  –	  470.	  
Feinman,	  G.	  2001.	  Mesoamerican	  political	  complexity.	  The	  corporate-­‐network	  dimension.	  In	  From	  Leaders	  to	  
Rulers,	  ed.	  J.	  Haas,	  151-­‐175.	  New	  York:	  Kluwer	  Academic.	  
Fleming,	  A.	  1998.	  The	  quest	  for	  territorial	  pattern.	  In	  The	  Archaeology	  of	  Landscape,	  ed.	  P.	  Everson	  and	  T.	  
Williamson,	  42-­‐66.	  Manchester:	  Manchester	  University	  Press.	  
Fleming,	  A.	  2008.	  The	  Dartmoor	  Reaves.	  Investigating	  Prehistoric	  Land	  Divisions.	  Oxford:	  Windgather.	  
Folke,	  C.	  2006.	  Resilience:	  The	  emergence	  of	  a	  perspective	  for	  social-­‐ecological	  systems	  analysis.	  Global	  
Environmental	  Change	  16:	  253-­‐267.	  
Ford,	  W.	  1987.	  Some	  settlement	  patterns	  in	  the	  central	  region	  of	  the	  Warwickshire	  Avon.	  In	  English	  
Medieval	  Settlement,	  ed.	  P.	  Sawyer,	  143-­‐163.	  London:	  Arnold.	  
Gearey,	  B.,	  D.	  Charman,	  and	  M.	  Kent.	  2000.	  Palaeoecological	  evidence	  for	  the	  prehistoric	  settlement	  of	  
Bodmin	  Moor,	  Cornwall,	  Southwest	  England.	  Part	  II:	  Land	  use	  changes	  from	  the	  Neolithic	  to	  the	  
present.	  Journal	  of	  Archaeological	  Science	  27:	  493–508.	  	  
Gosden,	  C.	  1985.	  Gifts	  and	  kin	  in	  early	  Iron	  Age	  Europe.	  Man	  n.s.	  20:	  475-­‐493.	  
	  
Susan	  Oosthuizen,	  March	  2016	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Page	  10	  of	  12	  
	  	  
Hall,	  D.	  1987.	  The	  Fenland	  Project,	  Number	  2.	  Cambridgeshire	  Survey:	  Peterborough	  to	  March.	  East	  Anglian	  
Archaeology	  35.	  
Härke,	  H.	  1997.	  Early	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  social	  structure.	  In	  The	  Anglo-­‐Saxons	  from	  the	  Migration	  Period	  to	  the	  
Eighth	  Century:	  An	  Ethnographic	  Perspective,	  ed.	  J.	  Hines,	  125–60.	  Woodbridge:	  Boydell	  and	  Brewer.	  
Hayden,	  B.	  and	  A.	  Cannon.	  1982.	  The	  corporate	  group	  as	  an	  archaeological	  unit.	  Journal	  of	  Anthropological	  
Archaeology	  1:	  132-­‐158.	  
Herring,	  P.	  2008.	  Commons,	  fields	  and	  communities	  in	  prehistoric	  Cornwall.	  In	  Recent	  Approaches	  to	  the	  
Archaeology	  of	  Land	  Allotment,	  ed.	  A.	  Chadwick,	  70-­‐95.	  Oxford:	  British	  Archaeological	  Reports	  British	  
Series	  1875.	  
Herring,	  P.,	  A.	  Preston-­‐Jones,	  C.	  Thorpe,	  and	  I.	  Wood.	  2011.	  Early	  medieval	  Cornwall.	  Cornish	  Archaeology	  
50:	  263-­‐286.	  
Holling,	  C.	  2001.	  Understanding	  the	  complexity	  of	  economic,	  ecological	  and	  social	  systems.	  Ecosystems	  4:	  
390-­‐405.	  
Hooke,	  D.	  1981.	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  Landscapes	  of	  the	  West	  Midlands:	  The	  Charter	  Evidence.	  Oxford:	  British	  
Archaeological	  Reports	  British	  Series	  95.	  	  
Hunt,	  R.	  C.	  and	  A.	  Gilman,	  eds.	  1998.	  Property	  in	  Economic	  Context.	  Lanham:	  Society	  for	  Economic	  
Anthropology,	  University	  Press	  of	  America.	  	  
Ingold,	  T.	  1980.	  Hunters,	  Pastoralists	  and	  Ranchers:	  Reindeer	  Economies	  and	  Their	  Transformations.	  
Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
Joliffe,	  J.	  1933.	  Pre-­‐Feudal	  England.	  The	  Jutes.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
Jones,	  G.	  1987.	  Multiple	  estates	  and	  early	  settlement.	  In	  English	  Medieval	  Settlement,	  ed.	  P.	  Sawyer,	  9-­‐34.	  
London:	  Arnold.	  	  
Lewis,	  C.,	  P.	  Mitchell-­‐Fox,	  and	  C.	  Dyer.	  1997.	  Village,	  Hamlet	  and	  Field.	  Manchester:	  Manchester	  University	  
Press.	  
Locke,	  G.,	  C.	  Gosden,	  and	  P.	  Daly.	  2005.	  Segsbury	  Camp.	  Excavations	  in	  1996	  and	  1997	  at	  an	  Iron	  Age	  Hillfort	  
on	  the	  Oxfordshire	  Ridgeway.	  Oxford:	  Institute	  of	  Archaeology	  University	  of	  Oxford.	  
Lu,	  F.	  E.	  2001.	  The	  common	  property	  regime	  of	  the	  Huaorani	  Indians	  of	  Ecuador:	  Implications	  and	  challenges	  
for	  conservation.	  Human	  Ecology	  29,	  4:	  425-­‐447).	  
Malim,	  T.	  1992	  .	  Excavations	  and	  site	  management	  at	  Stonea	  Camp,	  Wimblington.	  Fenland	  Research	  7:	  27-­‐
34.	  
Malim,	  T.	  and	  R.	  McKenna.	  1993.	  Borough	  Fen	  Ringwork:	  Iron	  Age	  fort.	  Fenland	  Research	  8:	  53-­‐62.	  
Miller,	  E.	  1951.	  The	  Abbey	  and	  Bishopric	  of	  Ely.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
Neilson,	  N.	  1920.	  A	  Terrier	  of	  Fleet,	  Lincolnshire.	  London:	  British	  Academy.	  
Neilson,	  N.	  1928.	  The	  Cartulary	  and	  Terrier	  of	  the	  Priory	  of	  Bilsington,	  Kent.	  London:	  British	  Academy.	  
Netting,	  R.	  1976.	  What	  Alpine	  peasants	  have	  in	  common:	  Observations	  on	  communal	  tenure	  in	  a	  Swiss	  
village.	  Human	  Ecology	  4,	  2:	  135-­‐146.	  
O’Connor,	  T.	  2009.	  Culture	  and	  environment:	  Mind	  the	  gap.	  In	  Land	  and	  People,	  ed.	  M.	  J.	  Allen,	  N.	  Sharples,	  
and	  T.	  O’Connor,	  11-­‐18.	  Oxford:	  Oxbow	  Books.	  
Oosthuizen,	  S.	  2011.	  Archaeology,	   common	  rights,	  and	   the	  origins	  of	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	   identity.	  Early	  Medieval	  
Europe	  19:	  153-­‐181.	  	  
	  
Susan	  Oosthuizen,	  March	  2016	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Page	  11	  of	  12	  
	  	  
Oosthuizen,	  S.	  2013a.	  Beyond	  hierarchy:	  The	  archaeology	  of	  collective	  governance.	  World	  Archaeology	  45:	  
714-­‐29.	  
Oosthuizen,	  S.	  2013b.	  Tradition	  and	  Transformation	  in	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  England:	  Archaeology,	  Common	  Rights	  
and	  Landscape.	  London:	  Bloomsbury	  Academic.	  
Oosthuizen,	  S.	  2016a.	  Culture	  and	  identity	  in	  the	  early	  medieval	  fenland	  landscape.	  Landscape	  History	  37,	  1:	  
5-­‐24.	  
Oosthuizen,	  S.	  2016b.	  Review	  article:	  Recognising	  and	  moving	  on	  from	  a	  failed	  paradigm:	  The	  case	  study	  of	  
agricultural	  landscapes	  in	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  England	  c.400-­‐800AD.	  Journal	  of	  Archaeological	  Research	  24,	  
published	  first	  online	  November	  2015.	  
Östrom,	  E.	  1986.	  An	  agenda	  for	  the	  study	  of	  institutions.	  Public	  Choice	  48:	  3-­‐25.	  
Östrom,	  E.	  1990.	  Governing	  the	  Commons.	  The	  Evolution	  of	  Institutions	  for	  Collective	  Action.	  Cambridge:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
Plielinger,	  T.,	  and	  Bieling,	  C.,	  eds.	  2012.	  Resilience	  and	  the	  Cultural	  Landscape.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press.	  
Pryor,	  F.	  1998.	  Etton:	  Excavations	  at	  a	  Neolithic,	  Causewayed	  Enclosure	  near	  Maxey,	  Cambridgeshire,	  1982-­‐
7.	  Swindon:	  English	  Heritage.	  
Pryor,	  F.	  2001.	  The	  Flag	  Fen	  Basin:	  Archaeology	  and	  Environment	  of	  a	  Fenland	  Landscape.	  Swindon:	  English	  
Heritage.	  
Reynolds,	  S.	  1983.	  Medieval	  Origines	  Gentium	  and	  the	  community	  of	  the	  realm.	  History	  68,	  224:	  375-­‐390.	  
Reynolds,	  S.	  1984.	  Kingdoms	  and	  Communities	  in	  Western	  Europe.	  Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press.	  
Roffe,	  D.	  1993.	  On	  Myddan	  Gyrwan	  Fenne:	  Intercommoning	  around	  the	  island	  of	  Crowland.	  Fenland	  
Research	  8:	  80-­‐86.	  
Roffe,	  D.	  2005.	  The	  historical	  content.	  In	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  Settlement	  in	  the	  Siltland	  of	  Eastern	  England,	  A.	  
Crowson,	  T.	  Lane,	  K.	  Penn	  and	  D.	  Trimble,	  264-­‐288.	  Heckington:	  Lincolnshire	  Society	  for	  Archaeology	  
and	  History.	  
Schlager,	  E.,	  and	  Östrom,	  E.	  1992.	  Property-­‐rights	  regimes	  and	  natural	  resources:	  A	  conceptual	  analysis.	  Land	  
Economics	  68,	  3:	  249-­‐62.	  
Stafford,	  P.,	  J.	  Nelson,	  and	  J.	  Martindale.	  2001.	  Introduction	  to	  Law,	  Laity	  and	  Solidarities.	  Essays	  in	  Honour	  
of	  Susan	  Reynolds,	  ed.	  P.	  Stafford,	  J.	  Nelson,	  and	  J.	  Martindale,	  1-­‐11.	  Manchester:	  Manchester	  
University	  Press.	  
Stilz,	  A.	  2011.	  Nations,	  states,	  and	  territory.	  Ethics	  121:	  572-­‐601.	  
Trawick,	  P.	  2001.	  Successfully	  governing	  the	  commons:	  principles	  of	  social	  organisation	  in	  an	  Andean	  
irrigation	  system.	  Human	  Ecology	  29,	  1:	  1-­‐25.	  
	   	  
	  
Susan	  Oosthuizen,	  March	  2016	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Page	  12	  of	  12	  
	  	  
Figures	  and	  captions	  
	  
Figure	  1	   The	  location	  of	  regions	  and	  sites	  mentioned	  in	  the	  text.	  
Figure	  2a	   ‘Vertical’	  hierarchical	  governance	  in	  which	  there	  is	  a	  direct	  relationship	  between	  individual	  
wealth	  and	  status	  and	  access	  to	  power	  
Figure	  2b	   Complementarity	  between	  equitable	  ‘horizontal’	  governance	  through	  CPrRs	  and	  ‘vertical’	  
governance	  exercised	  through	  hierarchies	  
Figure	  3	   Complexity	  of	  nested	  rights	  of	  common	  and	  membership	  across	  a	  number	  of	  CPrRs,	  from	  
local	  to	  territorial	  
Figure	  4	   Clusters	  of	  medieval	  intercommoning	  communities	  fossilise	  the	  territories	  of	  early	  medieval	  
folk-­‐groups	  that	  predated	  the	  emergence	  of	  manors.	  The	  head	  of	  each	  pin	  shows	  the	  
location	  of	  the	  medieval	  settlement	  in	  each	  community,	  and	  the	  end	  of	  the	  pin	  the	  area	  in	  
which	  land-­‐holders	  within	  each	  community	  had	  rights	  of	  common.	  
	  
